Bernard Gert

Bernard Gert (born October 16, 1934 in Cincinnati, Ohio--died December 24, 2011 in North Carolina) was a moral philosopher known primarily for his work in normative ethics, as well as in medical ethics, especially pertaining to psychology. His work is notable for its emphasis on the greater importance to commonsense morality of avoiding causing evil as opposed to promoting good.[1] Although his moral system shares similarities to deontology, rule utilitarianism, and contractarianism, Gert does not ally himself with any of those positions.[2] He writes, "I think that my view is best characterized as a natural law theory . . . in the tradition of Hobbes".[3] He also writes, "my view has been characterized as Kant with consequences, as Mill with publicity, and as Ross with a theory."[4]

Gert studied philosophy at Cornell University. He was a professor at Dartmouth College for fifty years, from 1959-2009. He is presently the Stone Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, Emeritus at Dartmouth. He also has other adjunct and visiting appointments.

Gert is a fellow of the Hastings Center, an independent bioethics research institution.

Contents

The importance of evil

Gert believes evil is that which all rational creatures seek to avoid, namely, death and suffering. He maintains that the worst evils are far more important in terms of their effects than the greatest goods, and that it is therefore appropriate for morality to emphasize the avoidance of evil.[5]

Rationality and impartiality

To understand Gert's philosophy, it is important to understand the role rationality plays. According to Gert, acting rationally does not require acting morally, in some cases.[6] However, it does require that we avoid harming ourselves without an adequate reason. Therefore, a rational person would not cause his own pain unless it were for an adequate reason, for example, to cure a disease. Even a masochist causes pain for a reason, presumably for pleasure. This helps show that no rational being seeks to harm himself for its own sake.

There are approximately five sorts of irrational desire according to Gert: seeking death, pain, disability, loss of freedom, or loss of pleasure. We arrive at moral rules by extending these objects of irrational desire to others. Rationality, alone, does not require this. However, if we adopt the principle of impartiality, whereby we apply the rules without regard to who gains or loses, we extend these prohibitions to others. This results in rules such as do not kill, do not cause pain, do not disable, and so forth.

Ten moral rules

In his book Common Morality: Deciding What to Do, Gert proposes ten moral rules which, if followed, create a moral system. The rules are as follows:

  1. Do not kill
  2. Do not cause pain
  3. Do not disable
  4. Do not deprive of freedom
  5. Do not deprive of pleasure
  6. Do not deceive
  7. Keep your promises
  8. Do not cheat
  9. Obey the law
  10. Do your duty.

Gert says that these rules are not absolute and can be violated by following a two step procedure. The first step is to ascertain all morally relevant information about the scenario at hand in order to make a justified evaluation. The second step is to consider the ramifications of other people knowing that they can violate the moral rule in similar circumstances. An example of this would be if you were to consider violating rule #9 (breaking the law) in order to run a red light. You evaluate the scenario and notice that there are no cars around and running the red light will not cause any harm, however, you do not want other people to know that they can run red lights too, because that would lead to more car accidents, which is indirectly causing pain and death. Another example of violating the moral rules would be killing in self defense. If you evaluate the situation, you find that if you do not kill the other person, they will violate one of the moral rules and kill you. Also, it would be acceptable in this scenario for other people to know that killing in self-defense is allowable.

Sources

By Bernard Gert:

References

  1. ^ Bernard Gert, Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, 2005, Ch. 4.
  2. ^ Bernard Gert, Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. xiii.
  3. ^ Bernard Gert, Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. xiii-xiv.
  4. ^ Bernard Gert, Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. xiii.
  5. ^ Bernard Gert, Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, 2005, Ch. 4.
  6. ^ Bernard Gert, Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, 2005, Ch. 13.

External links